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Using the deviations from the put-call parity, we investigate the existence of relevant 
information about the future stock price not yet incorporated in the stock market. In order to 
capture the extent of the mispricing between pairs of calls and puts’ options, we calculate daily 
volatility spreads as the weighted average of the difference between implied volatilities. We 
use the option signals provided by our measure to create stock portfolios, assessing the 
informational flow between the two markets. We find a strong evidence that relatively 
expensive calls in respect to puts carry more information about future stock returns than the 
opposite: the hedge portfolio earns a four-week abnormal return of 31.6 bps. We further extend 
our research to study the effect of liquidity and informed trading. Our results suggest that the 
most liquid options are the ones conveying more information about future stock returns. 
Furthermore, informed trading is only relevant when its probability in the stock market assumes 
high values. Finally, we show an increase of returns’ predictability in the post-financial crisis 
period, which contradicts the argument present in literature that this flow would tend to 
disappear due to the learning process of the market participants. Overall, we provide evidence 
on return predictability by the incorporation in the stock market of information intrinsic to the 






Keywords: price discovery process, put-call parity, volatility spread, informed trading 







Podemos antecipar o mercado de ações através 
da paridade entre opções de compra e de 








Através dos desvios da paridade entre opções de compra e de venda, investigamos a existência 
de informação relevante sobre o preço futuro das ações, não incorporada no mercado de ações. 
De forma a quantificar o mispricing entre os dois tipos de opção, calculamos spreads de 
volatilidade definidos como a média ponderada da diferença entre as volatilidades implícitas 
pela opção de compra e de venda. Os diferentes níveis de indicadores revelados definem a 
criação de cada portfolio de ações, o que nos permitirá avaliar o fluxo de informação entre os 
dois mercados. Os resultados mostram que as opções de compra, sobrevalorizadas face às de 
venda, compreendem mais informação sobre os retornos futuros do mercado de ações do que o 
inverso: o hedge portfolio obtém um retorno anormal de 31.6 pp, após quatro semanas da sua 
formação. Numa extensão da análise, estudamos o efeito da liquidez e da existência de trading 
informado no mercado de ações. Os resultados sugerem que as opções mais líquidas são as que 
transmitem mais informação futura. Por outro lado, a existência de trading informado apenas 
se torna relevante quando a sua probabilidade assume valores elevados. Por último, verificamos 
um aumento na previsibilidade dos retornos no período após a crise financeira, o que não revela 
a aprendizagem dos participantes como referido na literatura. No geral, encontramos evidência 
da previsibilidade dos retornos através da incorporação, no mercado de ações, de informação 
intrínseca aos desvios da paridade entre opções de compra e de venda.   
 
 
Palavras-chave: descoberta do preço, paridade entre opções de compra e de venda, spread de 
volatilidade, trading informado 
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In a perfectly efficient market, the asset prices should reflect the information available in 
the market, and they should be able to adjust quickly and without any bias to the presence of 
new information (Fama and Malkiel, 1970). The convergence to the new equilibrium through 
the incorporation of the new information is part of the price discovery process. If highly 
connected financial assets are traded on different markets, each one may differently contribute 
to the price discovery. Commonly, the market with higher liquidity, lower transaction costs and 
higher leverage is associated to be a dominant market in this process (Booth, So and Tse, 1999). 
Stocks and equity options are a clear example of two financial assets strongly related and traded 
in different markets.  
In accordance with the standard option pricing models, the price of an option is determined 
in part by the price of its underlying asset. The literature suggests characteristics of the option 
market to justify the preference over the stock markets by investors who possess private 
information (Black, 1975; Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas, 1998). The higher leverage achievable 
in these markets allied with downside protection and absence of short-sale restrictions turn the 
option market the choice for informed trading (Chakravarty, Huseyin and Mayhew, 2004). In 
this sense, we would anticipate that the new information about stock prices is first reflected in 
the option market. Following this intuition, across the literature there is evidence that order 
imbalance and abnormal trading volume in the option market can predict future stock returns 
(Pan and Poteshman, 2006; Cremers and  Weinbaum, 2010; Hu, 2014). 
In this dissertation, we attempt to identify an information flow between the option and the 
stock market. Specifically, we address the following question: do deviations from put-call parity 
contain relevant information about the future stock price, and subsequently returns, not yet 
incorporated in the stock market? Using the volatility spreads, we investigate the relative 
position of call and put prices and its resultant predictability power. Our measure of deviations 
from put-call parity is computed as the weighted average of the difference in implied volatilities 
from calls and puts. Each volatility spread is calculated for an option pair: a call and a put option 
on the same underlying equity, with equal strike price and expiration date. The timeframe used 
ranges between January 2003 and December 2017, and we only considered options whose 
underlying is a stock included in the S&P500 stock index. 
We calculate volatility spreads for each day of our timespan and we take advantage of the 




portfolios is adjusted using a 4-factor model, which includes the 3-Fama French factors and the 
Carhart (1997) momentum factor, over the investment horizon of one and four weeks. When 
computing returns, one possible concern is the non-synchronicity between the stock and the 
option’s markets. If we use only closing prices, some information contained in the deviations 
could be due to the two-minute difference in the closing time of the markets. In order to 
overcome this concern, all the computed returns are open-to-close, meaning that the return only 
starts to accrue in the next opening day of the market. This contributes to the robustness of our 
results since we ensure that the information displayed by the option market, yet to be 
incorporated in the stock market, is not the result of the closing time difference between the two 
markets.  
Firstly, we start by creating portfolios of stocks according to the level of the volatility spread 
and we find statistically and economically significance regarding evidence of predictability. 
Focusing on the hedge portfolio, which is long on stocks with positive volatility spreads (more 
expensive calls relative to puts) and short on stocks with negative volatility spreads (less 
expensive calls relative to puts), our results report a value weighted (four-factor adjusted and 
not annualized) abnormal return of 13.2 bps over the first week. Secondly, we create portfolios 
based on two option signals: the level and the change of the volatility spreads. In this setting, 
the hedge portfolio is long on stocks with positive and increasing volatility spreads and short 
on stocks with negative and decreasing volatility spreads. It reports a weekly abnormal return 
(value-weighted, four-factor adjusted and not annualized) of 62.6 bps, which exhibit stronger 
evidence of predictability. Since the portfolios earn higher statistically significant returns on the 
four-week investment horizon (comparing with the one-week), we find evidence that the 
information encompassed by option prices is only fully incorporated into stock prices some 
days after. These two portfolio strategies are the core of our work.  
We further extend our study to analyze the impact of some factors on the information flow 
between the option and the stock market identified before, specifically liquidity and information 
risk (following Easley et al. (1998)). Our first extension refers to liquidity. We create different 
measures of option liquidity commonly used in the literature, and then, for each day and 
underlying asset, we divide the options according to their liquidity level. In this regard, we re-
calculate the daily volatility spreads and we follow the same methodology concerning portfolio 
formation process based on their level. We find evidence that high-liquidity portfolios are better 
predictors of future stock returns, since they earn higher abnormal return than the low-liquidity 




although with a smaller timespan because data is unavailable beyond 2010. Using the 
probability of informed trading (henceforth, PIN) developed by Brown and Hillegeist (2007), 
we demonstrate that when the stocks are exposed to more information risk (higher asymmetric 
information), the deviations from put-call parity are more likely to take place. We apply this 
finding in the portfolio formation process, conducting a double sort on stocks according to the 
level of volatility spreads and level of PIN. Both results are in accordance with Easley et al. 
(1998) and Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), confirming the role of liquidity and informed 
trading in the price discovery process.  
Our study provides a contribution to several fields of ongoing research. Firstly, we provide 
evidence of information contained in the option market yet to be reflected in the stock prices of 
the largest U.S. listed companies. Previous research found a weakening of the information flow 
between the two markets with the increase of companies’ size (Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas,  
1998; Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010). To a certain extent, our results contradict the past 
findings, since we document the existence of this flow even studying companies with greater 
market capitalization. Secondly, our dissertation encompasses the 2008 subprime crisis, a 
period without a focus on current literature in this field of studies. In order to see if the 
informational flow changes before, during and after the financial crisis, we cluster our data into 
three groups according to the year they belong, and we reconduct our methodology.  We find 
stronger evidence of that information flow in the after-crisis period, using the level option 
signal, which may contradict the Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) findings. They found evidence 
of a gradual elimination of the mispricing due to the learning process of the market participants 
and the decrease of trading costs, but they only included data from a pre-crisis period (until 
2005). This last finding is somehow unexpected, since one would anticipate a decrease in flow’s 
relevance because of the market changes introduced after the subprime crisis.  
The remainder of our dissertation proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the most 
relevant literature in which our research is included. Section 3 describes the data sources used 
and the data cleaning process conducted, as well as descriptive statistics on call’s and put’s 
characteristics. Section 4 discusses the methodology employed to develop the different 
portfolios and to measure their returns. In Section 5, we report our findings regarding the 
portfolios’ performance, for each investment strategy and time horizon. Following for section 
6, we expand our study to the analysis of the effect of liquidity and informed trading, presenting 
different methodologies and the respective findings. In section 7, we conclude our work, while 




2. Literature Review 
Using the beauty contest analogy suggested by Keynes (1936) as a starting point, Schreiber 
and Schwartz (1986) defined the price discovery process of market securities as an imperfect 
process where the arrival of new information is integrated through trades and price changes, 
reaching a completely new market equilibrium price. Lehman (2002) characterized this 
mechanism by the efficiency and timeliness, which are the relative speed and the relative 
absence of noise, to incorporate the information implied in trading into market prices. 
Furthermore, Yan and Zivot (2010) described this dynamic process as one of the primary roles 
of financial markets since, after the entry of new information in the market, it allows a fast 
adjustment of the security price to its fundamental value. 
The relationship between a price series and its contribution to the price discovery process is 
a topic discussed across the literature. Chakravarty, Huseyin and Mayhew (2004) and Mizarach 
and Neely (2008), interpreted it as the extent to which a price series is the first to reflect new 
information in the security market price. Some years later, Rittler (2012) made a broader 
interpretation including the markets instead of just the price series. By other hand, Forte and 
Pena (2009) considered that it is just a matter of understanding which asset class leads or lags 
the others. In this perspective, and following Yan and Zivot (2010), there are two important 
points to address: which market is the first to incorporate the new information, and how can the 
process be affected by the different characteristics of the market (as liquidity, asymmetric 
information, trading mechanisms)? 
Some authors dedicated their studies to the analysis of the informational discovery role of 
the option market for the respective underlying assets, specifically stocks, with three effects 
identified (Kumar, Sarin and Shastri, 1998; Chen and Chung, 2012). Firstly, the opportunity set 
of investors can be expanded (Ross, 1976; Hakansson, 1982). Secondly, the level of information 
available to the public may increase, which would improve markets’ efficiency by reducing the 
presence of asymmetric information (Kumar et al., 1998). Thirdly, the option market exihibit 
favourable characteristics to the presece of informed trading, such as lower transaction costs, 
lower leverage and the absence of trading limitations, as short selling restrictions, when 
compared to the stock market (Black, 1975; Chakavarty et al., 2004).   
Accordingly, which of the two markets effectively leads (or lags) the incorporation of new 
information disclosures is not a recent topic. Using stock prices implied by closing option 




price changes in the stock market. Some years later, Bhattacharya (1987) found that option 
prices hold information not incorporated in contemporaneous stock prices, and this finding 
remains valid for 1-day period if option trading volume is used as indicator (Anthony, 1988). 
Contradicting these results, Stephan and Whaley (1990) performed causality tests in a 
multivariate time-series setting and found that stocks’ quotes tend to lead options’ quotes. Chan, 
Chung and Johnson (1993) identified no evidence of leadership in either market, arguing that 
Stephan and Whaley (1990) identified a spurious relation due to the infrequent options’ trading. 
 The development of sequential-trade models emerges with these conflicting findings. Since 
they allow investors to trade either in the stock or the options’ market, these models are crucial 
to understand the information flow between both markets. Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas (1998) 
identified that, in a polling equilibrium, informed investors would to the option market in order 
to take advantage of the information they possess, and thus the option trades should carry 
information about future stock movements. This price discovery role is intensified by some 
factors in the option market as liquidity, leverage or probability of informed trading, when 
comparing with the stock market. 
After Easley et al. (1998) results, a new wave of research emerged focused on microstructure 
models. Chakravarty, Huseyin and Mayhew (2004) found that 17-18% of the price discovery 
occurs in the option market, being even more prominent if the option bid-ask spread is higher 
or the option volume is lower. In this perspective, Chen, Lung and Tay (2005) controlled for 
moneyness, asymmetric information and liquidity and detected evidence of feedback relations 
on trades between out-of-the-money options and the underlying assets (finding also confirmed 
by Pan and Poteshman (2006)).  Using a VAR-bivariate-GARCH model, Bali and Hovakimian 
(2009) observed an information flow from the option market to the stock market, which 
indicates that informed investors are trading first in the options’ markets. On other research line, 
some authors used the deviations from put-call parity to understand the information flow 
between the two markets and the predictability power relative to the underlying. This last 
measure will be used as the base for our empirical work. 
The put-call parity is an arbitrage mechanism that maintains the call and put prices aligned 
without the interference of the demands of options’ buyers (Stoll, 1969). A simple deviation 
from put-call parity can not always be considered as a tradable arbitrage opportunity. There are 
some market features identified across literature that prevent the relation to hold, such as: 
transaction costs, dividend payments, early exercise value of American options, 




borrowing rates (Brenner and Galai, 1986; Nisbet, 1992; Kamara and Miller, 1995). Besides 
the market features identified, the apparent deviations can still occur due to short-sale 
constraints, data-related problems (noise) or informed trading activity.  
Regarding the short-sale restrictions, Ofek and Richardson (2003) identifying that higher 
borrowing costs are associated with larger deviations in internet-related companies. In a broader 
cluster, Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2004) found that these deviations are not equal for 
both long and short side: they are asymmetric in the direction of short-sales constraints, being 
their magnitude associated with the cost and difficult of short-selling.   
On the other hand, some authors considered that they are just a product of trading activity 
by investors who possess private information, which goes in line with the point presented 
earlier. Bollen and Whaley (2004), and then Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2008), studied 
the impact of options’ demand in its price. They found that if informed investors demand 
specific option contracts, this can change the implied volatility of these contracts relative to the 
others, inducing call and put option prices to diverge. Years later, Atilgan (2014) perceived 
greater deviations around significant information events, like earning announcements, which 
are associated with a greater presence of informed investors in the market.  
 
3. Data 
In this study, we focus on equity options whose underlying is a stock of an S&P 500 index 
constituent from January 2003 to December 2017. The timeframe considered is the one that 
enables us to take into consideration the impact of the financial crisis on the informational role 
of options, something that, to the best of our knowledge, is yet to be studied. In this section, we 
first describe the databases used and the consequent data treatment required to perform our 
analysis. We then conclude with a description and interpretation of the relevant descriptive 
statistics.  
We began by extracting the tickers of the constituents’ companies of the S&P 500 index 
between 2003 and 2017 from Computstat, a database of financial, statistical and market 
information on active and inactive global companies. The companies selected should have 
belonged to the index for at least one month during the timespan defined. 
Subsequently, we collected all the specific information of the equity options and its 




public companies. Among all variables reported, the ones of interest are end-of-day bid and ask 
quotes, strike price, expiration date, open interest, volume and implied volatility1. Upon the 
extraction, a set of filters and criteria were immediately put into place. In order to mitigate the 
impact of nontrading, we only consider options with a positive trading volume (Cao and Wei, 
2010; Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010; Faias and Santa-Clara, 2017). To diminish the report 
errors, option quotes with the bid price higher than the ask price, or with a bid price lower or 
equal to zero, were excluded (Goyal and  Saretto, 2009; Driessen and Maenhout, 2009). We 
only extract options with a not null implied volatility to ensure that option quotes do not violate 
basic no-arbitrage relations that make impossible the calculation of implied volatilities 
(Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010). Lastly, to guarantee the representativeness of our sample, we 
eliminated options with less than one month or more than one year until expiration. 
For the period under analysis, we have a total of 24,250,582 call options and 21,269,186 put 
options, comprising a total of 625 different firms. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics on 
variables concerning put’s and call’s characteristics such as open interest, volume, implied 
volatility and bid price.  
In our initial sample, we have more call’s than put’s contracts, with a greater volume, open 
interest and bid price. Focusing on their implied volatility, calls present lower values than puts, 
which indicates a positive call-put implied volatility spread associated with future underlying 
stock returns (Bali and Hovakimian, 2009; Doran, Fodor and Jiang, 2013). Nevertheless, we 
should not only look to the pooled avarege, and we should take into consideration other factors 
such as strike price, moneyness and maturity of each option contract.  
Departing from call and put option data, we should focus on our measure of price pressure 
in the options market: the volatility spread. We created pairs of call and put options on the same 
underlying equity with the same strike and the same expiration date, for each day of our sample. 
Thus, we ended up with a sample of 11,633,684 valid option pairs across our timespan. Table 
2 describes this process, from daily option data to valid option pairs, displaying the number of 
observations eliminated by the application of the cleaning criteria.  
Afterwards, we accessed the daily data regarding the S&P500 constituents, chosen as 
underlying at the first stage, from CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices), a global 
                                                 
1 According to the IvyDB US Data Reference Manual, the implied volatilities of American options are calculated applying a 
binomial tree. It uses the closing price of the underlying asset and the historical LIBOR/Eurodollar rates as interest rate input, 





database of historical stock market data. We only considered stocks with a minimum price of 
$5, following Cremers and Weinbaum (2010). In order to eliminate unreliable data, we 
eliminated stocks from our sample that have bid prices higher than, or equal to, ask prices 
(Goyal and  Saretto, 2009; Driessen and Maenhout, 2009; Cao and Wei, 2010), and with bid 
prices lower than $0.125, which allows us also to minimize the impact of the tick size on bid-
ask spreads (Cao and Wei, 2010). We merged the stock data – bid and ask quotes, volume and 
number of shares outstanding – with the option data using the OptionMetrics CRSP Link 
provided by WRDS (Wharton Research Data Services). Lastly, we applied a filter to our sample 
related with the moneyness of the options considered. Following Chen, Lung and Tay (2005), 




), setting an acceptable range of values between 0.8 and 1.2. This final filter 
allows us to avoid potential pricing structure issues by eliminating all the options that are far 
from being at-the-money (Cao and Wei, 2010) 
Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) highlighted a potential relation between the deviations and 
higher moments of the risk-neutral distribution of underlying assets. They followed the 
Runbinstein (1998) procedure, specifying returns’ distribution by return, volaitlity, skewness 
and kurtosis. They found that more skewed distributions of the underlying asset are associated 
with higher option moneyness and larger volatility spreads. In a way to contribute to the 
reduction of the skewness effect in our research, we previously eliminated deep-in-the-money 
and deep-out-of-the-money options and we we conduct a winzorization process here and in 
section 4.2. so as to reduce the impact of the extreme value os our study variables. 
The application of these criteria leads us with 10,047,532 valid option pairs for 613 unique 
firms. The most restricted criterion was the one related with moneyness, once eliminated more 
than 1.3 million of option pairs. 
 
4. Volatility Spreads and Future Stock Returns 
As discussed earlier, our main hypothesis is that deviations from put-call parity convey 
relevant information about future stock returns. If informed investors trade in option markets 
first rather than the stock market, the mechanism of information flow between the two markets 
and the quickness that it happens, are both a topic of interest. In order to study these, we create 




spread, and we consider the subsequent returns on those portfolios. The following section is 
organized as follows: firstly, we define the empirical methodology that is the base of our work; 
secondly, we characterize the volatility spreads of our sample; thirdly, we describe how stock 
portfolios are created and the method used to assess their performance; finnaly, we perform a 
preliminary analysis of the portfolios’ characteristics.  
4.1. Empirical Methodology 
Following the sequential trade model of Easley et al. (1998), buying a call or selling a put is 
a trade that carries positive information about future stock prices, which changes the relative 
price between the two option products. In a perfect market, the private information will be 
immediately incorporated in the underlying stock prices, and the put-call parity will be satisfied. 
However, in the real world, option prices can deviate from the fair values without generating a 
riskless arbitrage opportunity (Evnine and Rudd, 1985; Figlewski, 1989; Canina and Figlewski, 
1993). This can be verified since options can be American, and be subject to transaction costs, 
margin requirements, taxes and differences between borrowing and lending rates (Brenner and 
Galai, 1986; Nisbet, 1992; Kamara and Miller, 1995). In order to determine the extent of these 
price distortions, we use the difference in implied volatilities between call and put options with 
the same maturity and strike price (Jarrow and Wiggins, 1989; Amin, Coval and Seyhun, 2004; 
Cremers & Weinbaum, 2010) 
According with Stoll (1969) and Black and Scholes (1973), the put-call parity relation must 
hold in equality for European options on non-dividend paying stocks for any value of the 
volatility parameter (σ): 
 𝐶 − 𝑃 = 𝑆 − 𝑃𝑉(𝐾) (1) 
 ∀𝜎 > 0,  𝐶𝐵𝑆(𝜎) + 𝑃𝑉(𝐾) =  𝑃𝐵𝑆(𝜎) + 𝑆, (2) 
where 𝐶𝐵𝑆(𝜎) and 𝑃𝐵𝑆(𝜎) designate call and put prices according to Black-Scholes, 
respectively. Using the Black-Scholes pricing model, the implied volatility on a call is the 
number that makes the theoretical value equal to the current market price of the option (equation 
(3)). We get equation (4) through (2) and (3). 
 𝐶 =  𝐶𝐵𝑆(𝐼𝑉𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙) (3) 
 𝑃 =  𝑃𝐵𝑆(𝐼𝑉𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙) (4) 
The equations (3) and (4) imply that, for a given maturity and strike price, the implied 




verified, because we have to consider the possibility of early exercise. Following Merton (1973) 
for American options the put-call parity should be an inequality (5). 
 𝑆 − 𝑃𝑉(𝑑𝑖𝑣) − 𝐾 ≤ 𝐶 − 𝑃 ≤ 𝑆 − 𝑃𝑉(𝐾) (5) 
Since we have access to closing option quotes, we are only able to study deviations from the 
fair value and not effective violations of the relation identified in (5). Thus, we follow Battalio 
and Schultz (2006) and Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), and we use the difference between 
implied volatilities (after a correction for the dividend and early exercise effect) as merely 
deviations from the model. Our hypothesis is that these deviations cannot be considered pure 
arbitrage opportunities and that they contain relevant information about future stock 
performance. In an intuitive way, higher call (put) implied volatilities relative to put (call) 
implied volatilities indicate that calls (puts) are overpriced relative to puts (calls). 
In order to measure the price pressure in the option market, we use a weighted average of 
the difference between call and put implied volatilities, a volatility spread (denominated as VS 
in the equations), following Cremers and Weinbaum (2010). As weight, we use the average 
trading volume of each valid option pair. Thus, we compute the volatility spread for every day 
t and every stock i with put and call options data as: 
 𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡  =  𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠 −  𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑗,𝑡
𝑖𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑗=1 (𝐼𝑉𝑗,𝑡
𝑖, 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠 −  𝐼𝑉𝑗,𝑡
𝑖, 𝑝𝑢𝑡
), (6) 
where j denotes each of the 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 valid pairs of put and call options with the same maturity and 
strike price,  𝑤𝑗,𝑡
𝑖  are weights of trading volume2, and 𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  refers to the implied volatility (k=call, 
put) calculated using the Black-Scholes method adjusting for early exercise and expected 
dividends.  
As pointed out by Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), these differences between implied 
volatilities can be related with higher moments of risk-neutral distribution of underlying returns 
(particularly skewness). After applying the Rubinstein (1998) procedure, they adjusted option 
prices for underlying assets with nonzero skewness in order to calculate the implied volatilities 
through standard binomial trees. They found two important conclusions: firstly, a price pressure 
measure is noisier for deep-in-the-money puts; secondly, positive (negative) skewed 
distributions exhibit large negative (positive) volatility spread. These findings were taken into 
consideration in our dataset construction. 















4.2. Volatility Spreads Characteristics 
In section 3 we prepared our sample satisfying a set of criteria. After that process, we are 
able to create daily volatility spreads for each underlying asset, by performing a weighted 
average3 of the difference between call and put implied volatilities of each valid option pair. 
From January 2003 to December 2017, our sample has 1,215,511 daily volatility spreads.  We 
winsorized the volatility spreads at a 1% and 99% level. This last procedure eliminates larger 
volatility spreads (positive and negative), which are associated with negatively and positively, 
respectively, skewed distributions (Broadie, Chernov and Johannes, 2007; Cremers and 
Weinbaum, 2010). 
The number of underlying assets included in the sample increases, even though not 
monotonically, across the timespan: the first day comprises 208 stocks and the last 434. On 
average, each day has volatility spreads for 322 different stocks, with a minimum of 157 and a 
maximum of 441 stocks in a specific day. Graph 1 shows the evolution of the number of 
underlying assets included in our sample for each day considered across our timeframe.  
We find it useful to provide a preliminary analysis of our price pressure measure. Table 3 
reports the descriptive statistics of on volatility spreads from 2003 to 2017. The mean and the 
median of the volatility spreads are both negative, with a value of -0.27% and -0.21%, 
correspondingly. According with Ofek et al. (2004) it is frequenly puts being relative more 
expensive than calls, translated into negative volatility spreads. In this perspective, the 
distribution of our price pressure, specifically the sign of the mean and median, are in line with 
Ofek et al. (2004) findings. Graph 2 shows the distribution of the volatility spreads – It is worth 
to mention that the spikes in both extremes of the graph are due to the winsorizing process 
conducted earlier.  
The volatility spreads have a pooled standard deviation of 1.33%. The times-series standard 
deviation (the average, across firms, time-series standard deviation) is slightly higher, 1.38%, 
while the cross-sectional standard deviation (the standard deviation across firms in the time-
series averages) is lower, 0.37%. This indicates a cross-sectional variation on the volatility 
spreads. 
 
                                                 




4.3. Formation of Portfolios and Measure of Performance 
In order to test our main hypothesis, we create different portfolios of stocks based on our 
price pressure measure, the volatility spread, and compute the returns on those portfolios over 
two different investment horizons: one and four weeks. The allocation of the stocks into the 
respective portfolios follows two different strategies. The first uses the level of the volatility 
spread on Wednesdays, by splitting the sample into quintiles and then allocating the stocks into 
five portfolios according to the quintile to which they belong. The second strategy uses two 
different indicators: the change of the volatility spread from Tuesday to Wednesday, and its 
level on Tuesday. As before, we divide the sample into quintiles for each indicator and then we 
double sort the stocks according to each group created. In this way, this second strategy creates 
25 different portfolios (five per level and five per change signal).  
We repeat these portfolio formation processes every Wednesday using the method described 
above for each strategy. Afterwards, we compute the returns over the first week and over the 
following four weeks (this last investment horizon uses overlapping generations). The choice 
of Wednesday (and Tuesday in the level and change strategy) for the portfolio reallocation 
follows Hou and Moskowitz (2005) and Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) as a strategy to avoid 
the presence of noise on the returns’ measurement on Mondays and Fridays. According to 
Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) the returns calculated from Monday to Monday or from 
Friday to Friday present low and high autocorrelations, respectively. In this context, 
Wednesdays appear across the literature to be an adequate alternative.  
Each week we only include in our portfolios stocks with at least one reported valid option 
pair on Wednesday and Tuesday, which enable us to guarantee reliable option signals. However 
we have to take into consideration the existence of a few special cases: Wednesdays (or 
Tuesdays) that are not trading days. For these cases, we assume the values of the nearest trading 
day.  
When we are calculating the returns of the portfolios above mentioned, we should be aware 
of a potential problem: non-synchronicity, which arises with the usage of closing quotes. The 
stock exchange market and the options market do not close at the same time4. In this way, there 
is a two-minute gap between our option signal and the last stock trade, which could justify the 
existence of some deviations from put-call parity (Battalio and Schultz, 2006). In an effort to 
ensure that our results are robust and not influenced by spurious predictability, we ignore the 
                                                 




overnight return by computing open-to-close returns. With this procedure we use the option 
signal computed with the closing quote of a day, but the returns only start to accrue with the 
first trade of the following day, when the stock exchange market opens. 
In order to compute the abnormal return of our portfolios, we use a 4-factor model (equation 
(6)) which includes the three Fama-French factors5 (Fama and Kenneth, 1996) and a momentum 
factor (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Carhart, 1997). This model enables us to control for 
differences in risk and characteristics between the companies included.  
 𝑅𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  +  𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  +  𝜀𝑡, (7) 
being 𝑅𝑡 the excess return over the risk-free rate, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 the excess return on the market 
portfolio, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡, the return on three long/short portfolios that capture size, book-
to-market and momentum effects, respectively. 
The value of interest to measure the portfolio’s performance is the estimated value of the 
abnormal returns (?̂?). So, we run regression (7) by OLS, reporting robust standard errors for the 
one-week investment horizon. At the four-week frequency, the t-statistics are computed using 
the Newey-West autocorrelation correction6 due to the fact that we are using overlapping 
generations, which could lead the holding period returns to be autocorrelated up to the degree 
of the overlap (Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010). 
4.4. Preliminary Analysis of Portfolio Characteristics 
As explained in the previous section, we create weekly portfolios every Wednesday by 
sorting stocks into five groups based on the quintiles of the volatility spread. The number of 
stocks included in each portfolio varies overtime for two reasons: firstly, the S&P500 index 
constituents are not the same over the all timespan; secondly, options with no reported valid 
option pair on Wednesday and Tuesday are excluded from our sample. On average, each 
portfolio has 65 stocks (with a minimum of 37 and a maximum of 86 stocks), with 322 stocks 
overall. 
Despite the fact that we are considering the largest companies listed in U.S., our sample still 
has some variability in the market capitalization of the companies included. If we consider only 
the level portfolios, the ones with greater equal-weighted market capitalization are the middle 
portfolios, which are the ones with lower absolute deviations from put-call parity. The stocks 
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with extreme values of volatility spreads have lower equal-weighted market capitalization, 
which goes in line with previous research (Easley et al. 1997). The differences between the size 
of the extreme portfolios, (1) or (5), and the middle one, (3), are significant at a 1% significance 
level.  
Across the literature there are two possible explanations for this size effect. On one hand, 
the options written on smaller stocks can be less liquid, which can rise the transaction costs and 
consequently increase the arbitrage bounds. On another hand, information risk is more likely to 
affect smaller companies. Both liquidity and information risk effects are taken into 
consideration later on in our analysis. 
Before we evaluate the performance of our portfolios, as described before, we do an analysis 
to the preformation performance of the portfolios. We use the level portfolios, with the 
Wednesday signal, and we measure past value-weighted returns through the preceding week. 
Table 4 reports the characteristics of the volatility spread quintile portfolios and their 
performance on the prior week to the portfolios’ formation. As we go from the portfolio with 
greater negative volatility spreads, (1) to the one with greater positive volatility spreads, the 
past abnormal returns decline. Our results indicate that call options became relatively more 
expensive than puts after decreases in the underlying stock. In this way, our strategy can be 
considered as a contrarian momentum strategy, opposing to Amin et. al (2004) who showed 
that volatility spreads widen following a stock market rise.  
 
5. Performance Evaluation 
5.1. Level Portfolios 
 Each Wednesday, we create five portfolios according to the daily level of the volatility 
spread. Portfolio (1) includes stocks with the lowest level of volatility spread (quintile 1) and 
portfolio (5) comprises stocks with the highest (quintile 5). We create also a long/short portfolio 
(we will name it hedge portfolio), to which we buy stocks with the high levels of volatility 
spread and shorts stocks with the low values (essentially, we buy quintile 5 and short quintile 
1).  
 Afterwards, we evaluate the performance of each portfolio over the first week (1-week 
horizon) and also over the first 4 weeks (4-week horizon). All the calculated returns are value-
weighted (not annualized), and they do not include the first overnight return, being open-close 




two different investment horizons. The t-stats presented are computed using robust standard 
errors, in case of 1-week horizon (panel A), or using the Newey-West autocorrelation 
correction, in case of the 4-week horizon (panel B).  
 The average raw and abnormal returns are positive for all portfolios, reflecting an increase 
as we move from the first to the fifth portfolio. Hence, we can conclude that stocks with higher 
volatility spreads earn higher returns than stocks with lower volatility spreads. Focusing on the 
hedge portfolio, over the first week it earns a value-weighted abnormal return of 13.2 bps – a 
value significantly different from zero at 1% significance level (t-stat of 2.85). The short side 
of the portfolio does not earn an abnormal return significantly different from zero (t-stat of 
0.37), while the long side earns an abnormal return of 16.2 bps (significantly different from 
zero at 10% significance level). If we track the performance of the hedge portfolio over the 
subsequent four weeks, it earns a value-weighted abnormal return of 31.7 bps, also significant 
at a 1% significance level (t-stat of 3.61).  
 These results show that approximately one half of the abnormal returns, at the 4-week 
frequency, are due to the performance on the first week. Therefore, there is no evidence of 
reversal which suggests that this effect is due to information asymmetry rather than the pressure 
of market makers in the option’s market (for instance, as a result of delta hedging option 
positions in the underlying stock market).   
5.2. Level and Change Portfolios 
As reported by Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), there is a degree of persistence in the 
volatility spreads, particularly for the extreme values (among the securities they analysed, 
almost 25% of the them that were ranked in the tails remained there for a month). Despite the 
fact that we have reduced the existence of extreme values in our sample (through winsorization), 
it is still important to study if changes in volatility spreads carry important information besides 
the one conveyed by levels.  
Every Wednesday, we create twenty-five portfolios in accordance with the level of 
volatility spread on Tuesday and the subsequent change from Tuesday to Wednesday. At Table 
6 we report the performance of all portfolios built, but in this section we will only report and 
analyze the returns of relevant portfolios: the diagonal7 and the long-short portfolio. In this 
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subsection, the hedge portfolio buys stocks with both high level on Tuesday and high change 
from Tuesday to Wednesday, and shorts stocks with low signals, both level and change8. 
Firstly, we find that the raw and abnormal returns increase with the positive extension of 
the signal, meaning that the high level and change portfolio (5,5) earns higher returns than the 
low level and change portfolio (1,1). We should notice that this increase is verified for both 
investment horizons, but it is not monotonic as we observed in the last subsection with the level 
portfolios. This finding, common to both strategies, indicates that the deviations from put-call 
parity are not driven by short sale constraints since the long side of the hedge portfolio earns a 
weekly  alpha statistically different from zero (64.1 bps, with a 2.44 t-stat), which is higher than 
the short side (2.9 bps, not significantly different from zero).  
Secondly, when both signals are taken into account at the same time the predictability 
degree increases. The performance of the level and change portfolios is higher than the one of 
the level portfolios, for both investment horizons. The hedge portfolio, based on the joint 
strategy, earns a weekly alpha of 62.6 bps (with a t-stat of 2.27), which is considerably higher 
than the 13.23 bps earned with the level strategy.  
Lastly, we find that the degree of predictability decreases with the investment horizon. In 
this strategy, the abnormal return earned by the hedge portfolio over four weeks is no longer 
significantly different from zero (t-stat of 1.24), assuming a value of 51.2 bps. If we compare it 
with the performance of the hedge portfolio in the first week, (an alpha of 62.6 bps with a t-stat 
of 2.27), we see that the subsequent three weeks are not carrying any relevant performance, 
opposing to what we found in the prior strategy.  
 
6. Effect of liquidity and information risk 
In the previous chapters we used the deviations from put-call parity to investigate a possible 
information flow between the stock and the options market. We have also identified some 
factors that can affect the deviations, which will be our focus in this section. In this way, we 
will test if the level of liquidity, the existence of informed trading and asymmetric information 
are drivers of the identified information flow. 
                                                 




6.1. Option Liquidity 
Starting with the liquidity effect, we study if the predictability power is impacted by the 
liquidity level of the option pairs. Easley et. al (1998) demonstrate that the more liquid options 
are the stronger will be its predictability power. From this standpoint, we first define some 
option liquidity measures and then we use them to build the portfolios, by sorting stocks 
according to the liquidity level and the option signals, as before.  
6.1.1. Measures of Option Liquidity 
In order to understand if the most liquid pairs have higher predictive value than the others, 
we construct four different measures of option liquidity: dollar bid-ask spread, proportional bid-
ask spread, contract volume and dollar trading volume (Cao and Wei, 2010). 
The dollar bid-ask spread, DBA, is the difference between the closing ask and bid prices, 
(8). Although being the most common proxy, it is not a reliable liquidity measure for options. 
Keeping liquidity constant, a dollar bid-ask spread of an out-the-money option will be lower 
than its in-the-money counterpart. In this sense, the difference in the measure will not be due to 
liquidity, but to the moneyness of the option (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Cao and 
Wei, 2010). Despite the fact that we will use it, we will keep this shortcoming in mind 
throughout the results interpretation. 
 
DBA = 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑗 −  𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑗 (8) 
The proportional bid-ask spread (PBA) is defined as the dollar bid-ask spread divided by the 
average price of the closing bid and ask. To use it with options we have to take a volume-
weighted average of the proportional spreads within each day (9). This liquidity measure 
overcomes the limitation identified earlier, once it enables the comparison between options with 
different levels of moneyness (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Cao and Wei, 2010).  
 








𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑗 −  𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑗
(𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑗  +  𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑗) 2⁄
 (9) 
We also use two transaction-based measures: the contract volume (VOL) and the dollar 
trading volume (DVOL) (Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Kalodera and Schlag, 2004; Cao and 
Wei, 2010). The first is the total number of options traded during each day (9). The second is 
the midpoint between the bid and ask prices weighted by the options volume (10). 
 

















6.1.2. Option Liquidity Effect – A portfolio approach 
With the purpose of studying the impact of the liquidity level of an option pair in the 
information flow between the option and the stock market, we develop a portfolio approach 
based on the average liquidity of a pair and the option signals, as in previous sections. We repeat 
the portfolio formation process, described below, for each liquidity measure presented in 6.1.1.. 
Firstly, we compute the average liquidity of each option pair, after the calculation of the 
option liquidity, either call or put, using the four measures previously defined. Then, we 
construct three groups – high, medium and low liquidity – according to the terciles of each 
liquidity measure in that day. Hence, we compute three volatility spreads, one per each liquidity 
group.  
After that, for each liquidity group, the process is the same as before: each Wednesday, we 
sort the stocks into five different portfolios according to the volatility spread quintile which 
they belong to. We compute open-close returns and estimate portfolios’ performance in 
conformity with the explained in 4.2., either for the 1- or 4-week investment horizon. The 
comparison between the portfolios’ performance of different liquidity groups will enable us to 
examine if differences in option liquidity have an impact on its informational role.  
We create five level portfolios for each of the four liquidity measures presented in the 
previous section. However, we only analyze the results of the two most relevant, according to 
the literature: PBA and DVOL. The performance of the level portfolios for each liquidity group 




6.2. Information Risk 
Some investors have access to private information while the others only possess public 
information (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). The last ones, uninformed traders, are exposed to 
information risk, since they will not be able to optimally choose their portfolios using all the 
relevant information, as opposed to informed investors (Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'hara, 2010).  
In this sense, it is of our interest to study whether the deviations from put-call parity reflect 
the existence of informed trading. However, it is not possible to directly observe the extent of 
the private information. To overcome this issue, we use the probability of informed trading 
(PIN), developed by Brown and Hillegeist (2007), which is an extension of the EKO market 
microstructure model (Easley, Kiefer and O'hara, 1997). The PIN is an estimation of the 
probability that a trade was originated by an informed investor, according to the imbalance 
between buy and sell orders in the secondary market. Through the daily volume of buy and sell 
orders, the authors calculated PIN as follows: 
 




where 𝛼 is the probability of an information event, 𝜇 and 𝜀 are the trading intensity (number of 
trades per day) of informed and uninformed traders, respectively. By analyzing the previous 
equation, it is possible to take some conclusions: when private information events are more 
common and when the intensity of informed (uninformed) trading increases (decreases), the 
level of information asymmetry rises.  
We retrieved the data for this measure of information asymmetry through Stephan Brown’s 
open database9. The previously referred author computed PINs by quarter from 1993 to 2010, 
using the Venter and Dejong model (Venter and De Jongh, 2006), which are more robust than 
the basic EKO PINs. According to Brown and Hillegeist (2007), when private information 
events occur with more frequency, or the trading intensity of informed trading increases, 
information asymmetry will arise. In contrast, it will decline with the increase of trading 
intensity by uninformed investors.   
In order to study the characteristics of the volatility spread for a determined level of informed 
trading, we divide the PIN estimates into quintiles and then we allocate each volatility spread 
to the correspondent PIN group. At table 11 we report some summary statistics of the volatility 
spreads for each PIN group. We find that as the probability of informed trading increases (from 
                                                 




(1) to (5)), the volatility spreads become more negative and volatile, since both the average and 
the coefficient of variation increases in absolute value (even though, the values of the last 
statistics are not very different). 
Despite the fact that our sample includes the largest companies traded in the US (S&P 500 
constituents), we should be aware of the negative correlation between PIN and size, due to the 
fact that smaller companies are expected to have less liquid stocks and options (Aslan, Easley, 
Hvidkjaer and  O'Hara, 2007). With the purpose of studying if the probability of informed 
trading remains a determinant of the deviations from put-call parity even for smaller and less 
liquid stocks, Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) run cross-sectional regressions of the volatility 
spreads on PIN, controlling for size and liquidity. They report that PIN continues to be a relevant 
determinant of the deviations. 
6.2.1. Relation with Information Risk – A portfolio approach 
When the share of informed investors increases, the return predictability also tends to 
increase (Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas, 1998). Applying this to our work, we study whether the 
predictability of the volatility spreads is affected by the existence of informed risk (measured 
by PIN).  
Each Wednesday we sort stocks independently into two different categories, hence creating 
25 portfolios (5x5): we create quintiles based on PIN and quintiles based on volatility spreads. 
Then, we measure open-close returns for the 1- and 4-week investment horizon, with weekly 
rebalancing.  
Considering the results of the diagonal portfolios, only the portfolios that include stocks with 
high level of volatility spreads and high level of probability of informed trading have 
statistically significant abnormal returns (with 10% and 5% significance level, for 1-week and 
4-week investment horizon, respectively). Table 12 shows the mean and abnormal returns of 
the diagonal portfolios of stocks, sorted by the level of volatility spreads and probability of 
informed trading (proxied by PIN).  
However, in Appendix 9.9., we can see that if we keep the probability of informed trading 
constantly high (thus, (5)), all portfolios have statistically significant abnormal returns 
regardless of the level of the volatility spread on Wednesday. These results indicate that the 
probability of informed trading only has predictability power when combined with large 




7. Time-period effects 
In this section we divide our sample into three groups in order to study possible differences 
in the information flow before, during and after the financial crisis. Then, we re-conduct the 
process used before with the stock portfolios’ creation using the level option signal. 
Our sample period ranges from January 2003 to December 2017. This timespan covers 15 
years during which the market and the economy suffered some changes, namely with the 
financial crisis period. These changes over our timespan can have an impact in  our estimates 
and conclusions.  
With the purpose of addressing these concerns, we create three subperiods related with the 
financial crisis: 2003-2006 (pre-financial crisis), 2007-2010 (financial crisis) and 2011-2017 
(post-financial crisis). Afterwards, we repeat the process conducted in section 5.1., evaluating 
the performance of the level portfolios for each subperiod defined.  
We have different results for each subperiod considered. Starting with the pre-financial crisis 
period (from 2003 to 2006), only the fifth portfolio (higher positive volatility spread) earns 
statistically significant10 positive abnormal returns for a 1-week investment horizon (27.9 bps, 
with a t-stat of 2.41). For a 4-week investment horizon, the third portfolio earns also a 
significant positive abnormal return, even though it is smaller than the return earned on the fifth 
(59.3 vs 71.1, both significant at 5% significance level). Proceeding to the financial crisis period 
(from 2007 to 2010), the returns reported are all lower than the ones presented in the previous 
period, being all not statistically different from zero. Lastly, considering the portfolios built in 
the post-financial crisis (from 2011 to 2017), all of them earn statistically significant abnormal 
returns over 4-weeks, with the majority of the portfolios earning returns higher than the ones 
earned in the pre-financial crisis. Additionally, over the first week, the middle portfolios (lower 
volatility spread) seem to have higher predictability power than in its previous periods.  
Overall, our results show that the volatility spreads have a higher predictability power in the 
post-financial crisis period, mainly for the 4-week investment horizon. These goes against 
Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) findings: they identified a reduction of the return predictability 
degree of volatility spreads, considering a sample period from January 1996 to December 2005. 
  
                                                 





In our work we study the contribution of the option market to the price discovery process 
in the stock market. Specifically, we study the existence of information about future stock prices 
intrinsic to the deviations from put-call parity, a well-known relation between calls, puts and 
stock prices. The existence and the dynamics of the information flow between the option and 
the stock market is not consensual across the literature: some argue that it is due to the existence 
of short-sale restrictions, higher leverage, informed trading or prevalence of asymmetric 
information. The foundation argument of our work is that informed trading leads to the 
contribution, by the stock market, to the price discovery process in the stock market. 
As a measure of price pressure in the option market, we use the volatility spread which is 
the volume-weighted average difference between the implied volatility of a call and the implied 
volatility of a put for the same maturity, underlying stock and strike price. We focus on the 
largest market capitalization companies in the U.S., considering only options whose underlying 
asset is a stock constituent of the S&P 500 index. Each Wednesday, we create stock portfolios 
based on some characteristics of the volatility spreads (level, change and liquidity) and of the 
option market (probability of informed trading). 
Our results indicate that stocks with higher positive volatility spreads outperform stocks 
with lower and negative volatility spreads, meaning that relatively expensive calls in respect to 
puts carry more information about future stock returns than the other way around. Firstly, we 
use two different investment strategies: one based on the level of the volatility spread and other 
based on its level and change. Both hedge portfolios built earn value-weighted abnormal returns 
over, at least, the first week of investment, confirming the conclusion identified before. 
Secondly, we extend our analysis to study if different levels of options’ liquidity and probability 
of informed trading have influence on the future stock return predictability. We identified a 
positive relation in both factors: more liquid options and higher probability of informed trading 
induce a higher informational flow between the option and the stock market. Contrary to 
Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), we don’t document a decrease of the predictability degree over 
the sample period, since the portfolios created in the latest years of our sample (post-financial 
crisis period) earn higher returns than the earlier ones.  
Nevertheless, our analysis has some shortcomings representing possible extensions for 
future research. Firstly, we conduct a winsorization process to eliminate the extreme values of 




options with highest deviations from put-call parity. Secondly, to compute the abnormal returns 
we lack to control for skewness risk. Positively and negatively skewed distributions can be 
responsible for generating positive and negative volatility spreads. However this effect is most 
prominent on large differences in implied volatilities (some of them, we eliminate from our 
sample due to the winsorization process). Thirdly, for the study of the informed trading presence 
in the option market, the PIN data is only available until 2010, which reduces the sample to 
almost one half the initial one. Moreover, future research in this field could include the 
investigation on the effect of different levels of options’ moneyness and stocks’ liquidity. 
Finally, it would be worthwhile to explore the information flow between the two markets around 
important company information releases, for example earnings announcements, or the 
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10. Figures and Tables 







Variable Number of observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Call Option Characteristics
Open Interest 3,918 17,936 0 2,653,604
Volume 194 1,950 1 1,722,502
Implied Volatility 0.32 0.16 0.01 3.00
Bid Price 6.13 16.39 0.01 949.90
Panel B: Put Option Characteristics
Open Interest 3,129 12,050 0 2,357,458
Volume 143 941 1 590,728
Implied Volatility 0.35 0.18 0.01 3.00




Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of call and put options, from 2003 to 2017 
This table reports the descriptive statistics on the call and put options, from 2003 to 2017. 
Panel A and B aggregates all variable concerning put and call characteristics, respectively, 
such as open interest, volume, implied volatility and bid price. The statistical measures 
outlined contain the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum for each variable. 



















Description of the cleaning data process, from call and put raw data 
to valid option pairs. 
This table outlines the process of cleaning data, starting with call and put option raw data, 
for each day of our timespan (line 1.). First, we form daily pairs of calls and puts written on 
the same underlying equity stock, with the same maturity and strike price (line 2.). Second, 
we apply a set of criteria to our sample (line 3.): stock prices higher than $5 (I), bid prices 




, where 𝐾 and 𝑆 are the strike and stock price, respectively) ranges between 
0.8 and 1.2 (IV). Finally, we end up with the group of valid option pairs of more than 10 












3. Option Pairs meeting 
each criterion
4. Valid Option Pairs
Table 2: Description of the cleaning data process, from call and put raw data to 









The evolution of the number of underlying assets included in the 
sample, from 2003 to 2017. 
Figure 1 outlines the evolution of the number of underlying assets included in the sample 
for each day considered from 2003 to 2017. The number o stocks included varies because 
of two reasons: the number of S&P500 index constituents is not static and not all the stocks 
included have associated at least one option pair. The black line is the trendline that 




10.4. The distribution of daily volatility spreads  
  
Figure 2 
The distribution of daily volatility spreads, from 2003 to 2017 
Figure 2 outlines the distribution of daily volatility spreads from 2003 to 2017. The spikes 
on the extreme value of the volatility spreads are due to the winsorization process at 1% and 




10.5. Descriptive statistics on Volatility Spreads 
  
  
Panel A. Summary Statistics
Pooled Average -0.27%
Pooled Standard Deviation 1.33%
Time-Series Standard Deviation 1.38%


































Descriptive statistics on Volatility Spreads, from 2003 to 2017 
This table reports the descriptive statistics on the volatility spreads, from 2003 to 2017. The 
volatility spreads are computed as a weighted average difference between implied 
volatilities of calls and puts with the same maturity and strike price. Panel A reports the 
pooled average and standard deviation, the time-series standard deviation (computed as the 
average across firms of the time-series standard deviation), the cross-sectional standard 
deviation (computed as the cross-sectional standard deviation of the time-series average). 
Panel B reports the percentiles of the volatility spreads. 















1 2 3 4 5
Panel A.  Portfolio Characteristics
Number of Stocks 65 65 65 65 64
Market Capitalization 28,659 37,554 39,523 38,684 32,391
Price 57.23 62.34 64.62 65.36 60.14
Panel B. Preformation Performance (1-week)
48.4*** 36.1*** 28.6*** 8.5 -13.7
(5.58) (4.71) (4.03) (1.12) (-1.59)
43.4*** 31.7*** 24.5*** 4.1 -18.4***





Characteristics and preformation performance of the volatility spread portfolios 
This table describes the characteristics of the volatility spreads quintile portfolios. We use 
the level option signal to sort firms into quintiles every Wednesday. Panel A displays the 
level portfolio characteristics, such as the number of stocks included in each portfolio, the 
preformation market capitalization (a measure of size, in $millions), and the average bid 
price of the stocks included. Panel B reports the portfolio returns over the prior week to the 
formation. The returns presented are value weighted and calculated from the close of the 
previous Thursday to the open of Wednesday. We present mean returns and adjusted 
abnormal returns (alpha) in basis points per week. In parenthesis are reported the t-statistics 
computed using robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denotes statistically significant at a 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 














Performance of the level portfolios, over one and four weeks. 
This table reports the performance of the quintile portfolios formed on the level strategy 
over one (panel A) and four weeks (panel B) investment horizon. Every Wednesday, we 
sort stocks into five portfolios according to their level of volatility spreads and measure 
returns from the open on Thursday until the close of Wednesday. We report also the 
performance of the hedge portfolio: long on stocks with high volatility spread and short on 
stocks with low volatility spread. The returns are value-weighted and expressed in basis 
points (not annualized). We present mean returns and adjusted abnormal returns (alpha) 
using the four-factor model (the three Fama and French (1993) factors and the Carhart 
(1997) factor). The number in parentheses are t-statistics computed using either robust 
standard errors (1-week) or the Newey and West (1987) autocorrelation correction (4 
weeks). ***, ** and * denotes statistically significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
1 2 3 4 5
Panel A. 1-week
3.0 8.1 15.4** 12.6* 16.2** 13.23***
(0.37) (1.13) (2.21) (1.72) (1.94) (2.85)
2.6 7.5 15.1** 11.9 15.9* 12.9***
(0.31) (1.03) (2.12) (1.59) (1.88) (2.78)
Panel B. 4-week
28.7* 41.7*** 52.6*** 51.9*** 60.4*** 31.7***
(1.84) (3.01) (3.89) (3.64) (3.87) (3.61)
28.5 40.9* 51.8** 51.0** 60.1** 31.6***


































Performance of the level and change portfolios, over one and four weeks. 
This table reports the performance of the quintile portfolios formed on the level and change 
strategy over one (panel A) and four weeks (panel B) investment horizon. Every 
Wednesday, we independently double sort stocks into twenty-five portfolios according to 
their level of volatility spreads on Wednesday (five groups) and change between Tuesday 
and Wednesday (five groups). We measure returns from the open of Thursday until the close 
of Wednesday, however we only report the five diagonal portfolios and the hedge portfolio. 
The latter one is long on stocks with high and increasing volatility spread and short on stocks 
with low and decreasing volatility spread. The returns are value-weighted and expressed in 
basis points (not annualized). We present mean returns and adjusted abnormal returns 
(alpha) using the four-factor model (the three Fama and French (1993) factors and the 
Carhart (1997) factor). The number in parentheses are t-statistics computed using either 
robust standard errors (1-week) or the Newey and West (1987) autocorrelation correction 
(4 weeks). ***, ** and * denotes statistically significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
1,1 2,2 3,3 4,4 5,5
Panel A. 1-week
2.9 13.9 17.6*** 13.9 64.1*** 62.6**
(0.2) (1.51) (2.35) (1.46) (2.44) (2.27)
2.0 13.6 17.0** 13.3 63.7** 62.0**
(0.13) (1.42) (2.24) (1.37) (2.55) (2.31)
Panel A. 4-week
54.0 51.4*** 53.2*** 52.1*** 107.8*** 51.2
(1.89) (2.96) (3.50) (2.84) (2.87) (1.24)
55.0 51.2*** 52*** 51.3*** 109.8*** 54.1
(1.88) (2.93) (3.37) (2.79) (3.01) (1.35
Alpha









Table 7: Performance of level portfolios, over one and four weeks, according to the level of liquidity 
calculated using the dollar bid-ask spread. 
10.9. Performance of the level portfolios according to the option liquidity 




Performance of level portfolios, over one and four weeks, according to the level of 
liquidity calculated using the dollar bid-ask spread. 
This table reports the performance of the quintile portfolios formed on the level strategy 
over one (panel A) and four weeks (panel B) investment horizon, for two levels of option 
liquidity. Firstly, we divide the option sample into three groups according to their liquidity, 
and then, we create the daily volatility spreads for each underlying equity and liquidity 
group. The option liquidity measure used is the dollar bid-ask spread, defined as the 
difference between the closing ask and bid option prices. Secondly, every Wednesday, we 
sort stocks into five portfolios according to their level of volatility spreads and measure 
returns from the open on Thursday until the close of Wednesday. We report the performance 
of each quintile portfolio for low and high option liquidity, with value-weighted returns 
expressed in basis points (not annualized). We present mean returns and adjusted abnormal 
returns (alpha) using the four-factor model (the three Fama and French (1993) factors and 
the Carhart (1997) factor). The number in parentheses are t-statistics computed using either 
robust standard errors (1-week) or the Newey and West (1987) autocorrelation correction 
(4 weeks). ***, ** and * denotes statistically significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
1 2 3 4 5
Low Liquidity
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return 2.3 8.7 9.1 14.8** 11.2
(0.30) (1.18) (1.33) (1.98) (1.23)
Alpha 1.7 8.3 8.6 14.7* 10.9
(0.22) (1.11) (1.24) (1.95) (1.19)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return 26.1* 45.4*** 44.5*** 62.1*** 48.5***
(1.75) (3.41) (3.22) (4.38) (2.85)
Alpha 25.7* 44*** 43.4*** 62*** 48.7***
(1.70) (3.30) (3.11) (4.34) (2.88)
High Liquidity
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return 5.8 7.8 4.5 16.9** 10.0
(0.72) (1.11) (0.56) (2.03) (1.20)
Alpha 5.4 7.3 4.4 16.5** 9.4
(0.66) (1.03) (0.53) (1.98) (1.13)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return 40.9*** 26.9* 39.1*** 65.7*** 53.5***
(2.75) (1.89) (2.65) (4.43) (3.49)
Alpha 40.6*** 26.1* 38.3*** 65.7*** 53.3***





Table 8: Performance of level portfolios, over one and four weeks, according to the level of liquidity 
calculated using the proportional bid-ask spread 
  
1 2 3 4 5
Low Liquidity
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return 2.4 7.6 13.2* 14.5** 13.7
(0.30) (1.07) (1.89) (2.00) (1.61)
Alpha 1.9 7.1 12.7* 14* 13.1
(0.23) (1.00) (1.79) (1.89) (1.54)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return 23.5 44.9*** 42.4*** 51.0*** 57.3***
(1.59) (3.26) (3.17) (3.67) (3.54)
Alpha 23.1 43.9*** 41.7*** 50.6*** 57.2***
(1.55) (3.15) (3.09) (3.62) (3.55)
High Liquidity
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return 1.8 10.6 11.1 12.3* 16.8**
(0.22) (1.49) (1.53) (1.74) (2.06)
Alpha 1.1 10.1 10.9 11.7 16.4**
(0.13) (1.40) (1.46) (1.62) (2.01)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return 21.3 51.3*** 39.6*** 49.3*** 58.2***
(1.39) (3.87) (2.87) (3.55) (3.76)
Alpha 20.8 50.9*** 38.9*** 48.6*** 58.3***
(1.34) (3.80) (2.79) (3.46) (3.77)
Level Portfolios
Table 8 
Performance of level portfolios, over one and four weeks, according to the level of 
liquidity calculated using the proportional bid-ask spread. 
This table reports the performance of the quintile portfolios formed on the level strategy 
over one (panel A) and four weeks (panel B) investment horizon, for two levels of option 
liquidity. Firstly, we divide the option sample into three groups according to their liquidity, 
and then, we create the daily volatility spreads for each underlying equity and liquidity 
group. The option liquidity measure used is the proportional bid-ask spread, defined as the 
dollar bid-ask spread divided by the average price of the closing bid and ask prices. 
Secondly, every Wednesday, we sort stocks into five portfolios according to their level of 
volatility spreads and measure returns from the open on Thursday until the close of 
Wednesday. We report the performance of each quintile portfolio for low and high option 
liquidity, with value-weighted returns expressed in basis points (not annualized). We present 
mean returns and adjusted abnormal returns (alpha) using the four-factor model (the three 
Fama and French (1993) factors and the Carhart (1997) factor). The number in parentheses 
are t-statistics computed using either robust standard errors (1-week) or the Newey and West 
(1987) autocorrelation correction (4 weeks). ***, ** and * denotes statistically significant 





Table 9: Performance of level portfolios, over one and four weeks, according to the level of liquidity 




1 2 3 4 5
Low Liquidity
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return 1.6 10.3 13.0* 13.8** 14.0*
(0.21) (1.51) (1.85) (1.85) (1.66)
Alpha 1.1 9.8 12.6* 13.6* 13.2
(0.14) (1.41) (1.75) (1.78) (1.56)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return 22.1 48.4*** 42.5*** 51.8*** 57.6***
(1.50) (3.60) (3.15) (3.59) (3.67)
Alpha 21.6 47.8*** 41.8*** 51.7*** 57.1***
(1.45) (3.50) (3.07) (3.55) (3.65)
High Liquidity
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return 3.0 9.6 12.5* 12.3* 15.1*
(0.35) (1.38) (1.73) (1.74) (1.83)
Alpha 2.2 9.2 12.2* 11.7 14.8*
(0.26) (1.30) (1.65) (1.63) (1.77)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return 23.0 47.0*** 42.3*** 48.0*** 58.3***
(1.50) (3.52) (3.10) (3.43) (3.76)
Alpha 22.6 46.4*** 41.7*** 47.3*** 58.5***
(1.46) (3.44) (3.02) (3.35) (3.77)
Level Portfolios
Table 9 
Performance of level portfolios, over one and four weeks, according to the level of 
liquidity calculated using the contract volume. 
This table reports the performance of the quintile portfolios formed on the level strategy 
over one (panel A) and four weeks (panel B) investment horizon, for two levels of option 
liquidity. Firstly, we divide the option sample into three groups according to their liquidity, 
and then, we create the daily volatility spreads for each underlying equity and liquidity 
group. The option liquidity measure used is the contract volume, defined as the total number 
of options traded during each day. Secondly, every Wednesday, we sort stocks into five 
portfolios according to their level of volatility spreads and measure returns from the open 
on Thursday until the close of Wednesday. We report the performance of each quintile 
portfolio for low and high option liquidity, with value-weighted returns expressed in basis 
points (not annualized). We present mean returns and adjusted abnormal returns (alpha) 
using the four-factor model (the three Fama and French (1993) factors and the Carhart 
(1997) factor). The number in parentheses are t-statistics computed using either robust 
standard errors (1-week) or the Newey and West (1987) autocorrelation correction (4 






Table 10: Performance of level portfolios, over one and four weeks, according to the level of liquidity 
calculated using the dollar trading volume 
  
1 2 3 4 5
Low Liquidity
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return 3.3 10.6 12.4* 15.2** 12.8
(0.39) (1.54) (1.78) (2.01) (1.55)
Alpha 2.6 10.2 12* 14.8* 12.1
(0.31) (1.46) (1.68) (1.93) (1.46)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return 22.9 49.6*** 48.4*** 50.6*** 51.3***
(1.52) (3.75) (3.61) (3.51) (3.29)
Alpha 22.1 49.2*** 47.7*** 50.4*** 50.8***
(1.46) (3.69) (3.51) (3.47) (3.28)
High Liquidity
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return 2.4 9.9 13.0* 14.2** 12.9
(0.29) (1.42) (1.82) (1.99) (1.56)
Alpha 1.7 9.5 12.7* 13.7* 12.5
(0.19) (1.34) (1.75) (1.87) (1.5)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return 23.9 46.1*** 43.6*** 49.4*** 56.8***
(1.56) (3.43) (3.22) (3.56) (3.61)
Alpha 23.3 45.5*** 43.1*** 48.8*** 56.9***
(1.51) (3.35) (3.15) (3.48) (3.61)
Level Portfolios
Table 10 
Performance of level portfolios, over one and four weeks, according to the level of 
liquidity calculated using the dollar trading volume. 
This table reports the performance of the quintile portfolios formed on the level strategy 
over one (panel A) and four weeks (panel B) investment horizon, for two levels of option 
liquidity. Firstly, we divide the option sample into three groups according to their liquidity, 
and then, we create the daily volatility spreads for each underlying equity and liquidity 
group. The option liquidity measure used is the dollar trading volume, defined as the 
midpoint of the bid and ask prices weighted by the options volume. Secondly, every 
Wednesday, we sort stocks into five portfolios according to their level of volatility spreads 
and measure returns from the open on Thursday until the close of Wednesday. We report 
the performance of each quintile portfolio for low and high option liquidity, with value-
weighted returns expressed in basis points (not annualized). We present mean returns and 
adjusted abnormal returns (alpha) using the four-factor model (the three Fama and French 
(1993) factors and the Carhart (1997) factor). The number in parentheses are t-statistics 
computed using either robust standard errors (1-week) or the Newey and West (1987) 
autocorrelation correction (4 weeks). ***, ** and * denotes statistically significant at a 1%, 






10.10. Relation between the deviations from put-call parity and the presence of 


















1 2 3 4 5
Mean -0.442% -0.443% -0.477% -0.484% -0.494%
Standard Deviation 1.159% 1.177% 1.250% 1.299% 1.455%
Coefficient of Variation -2.621 -2.654 -2.623 -2.685 -2.948
Volatility Spreads by PIN
Table 11 
Descriptive statistics of volatility spreads for each PIN quintile 
This table presents the descriptive statistics on the volatility spreads, from 2003 to 2010, by 
the PIN quintile. PIN corresponds to the probability of informed trading defined and 
computed by Brown and Hillegeist (2007). We report the mean, the standard deviation and 
the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean). 









1,1 2,2 3,3 4,4 5,5
Panel A. 1-week
-1.4 2.7 5.9 13.3 23.1**
(-0.08) (0.20) (0.46) (1.10) (1.92)
-2.7 2.4 4.6 12.0 22.6*
(-0.15) (0.18) (0.34) (0.96) (1.87)
Panel B. 4-week
40.6 17.9 7.2 50.0** 61.1**
(1.36) (0.70) (0.31) (2.14) (2.35)
40.5 20.2 7.1 49.8** 60.8**
(1.36) (0.80) (0.31) (2.12) (2.37)
Alpha





Performance of the level and PIN portfolios, over one and four weeks 
This table reports the performance of the portfolios formed according to the level and PIN 
quintile over one (panel A) and four weeks (panel B) investment horizon, from 2003 to 
2010. Every Wednesday, we independently double sort stocks into twenty-five portfolios 
according to their level of volatility spreads on Wednesday (five groups) and their PIN (five 
groups). We measure returns from the open of Thursday until the close of Wednesday, 
however we only report the five diagonal. The returns are value-weighted and expressed in 
basis points (not annualized). We present mean returns and adjusted abnormal returns 
(alpha) using the four-factor model (the three Fama and French (1993) factors and the 
Carhart (1997) factor). The number in parentheses are t-statistics computed using either 
robust standard errors (1-week) or the Newey and West (1987) autocorrelation correction 
(4 weeks). ***, ** and * denotes statistically significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 








Performance of level portfolios, over one and four weeks, for three time-periods 
This table reports the performance of the quintile portfolios formed on the level strategy 
over one (panel A) and four weeks (panel B) investment horizon, for three time-periods. 
Firstly, we divide our sample into three groups according to the year position relative to the 
financial crisis: from 2003 to 2006 (before), from 2007 to 2010 (during) and from 2011 to 
2017 (after). Secondly, every Wednesday, we sort stocks into five portfolios according to 
their level of volatility spreads and measure returns from the open on Thursday until the 
close of Wednesday. We report the performance of each quintile portfolio for each 
subsample, with value-weighted returns expressed in basis points (not annualized). We 
present mean returns and adjusted abnormal returns (alpha) using the four-factor model (the 
three Fama and French (1993) factors and the Carhart (1997) factor). The number in 
parentheses are t-statistics computed using either robust standard errors (1-week) or the 
Newey and West (1987) autocorrelation correction (4 weeks). ***, ** and * denotes 






1 2 3 4 5
From 2003 to 2006 (before)
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return -0.6 3.3 17.2 17.2 27.9**
(-0.05) (0.30) (1.59) (1.55) (2.41)
Alpha -1.6 0.5 15.5 16.4 27.1**
(-0.14) (0.04) (1.38) (1.41) (2.27)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return 43.5* 35.8* 67.6*** 60*** 75.1***
(1.88) (1.68) (3.59) (3.10) (3.29)
Alpha 41.3 24.7 59.3** 54.6* 71.1**
(1.20) (0.80) (2.16) (1.83) (2.09)
From 2007 to 2010 (during)
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return -8.9 -4.3 12.4 -2.2 5.6
(-0.36) (-0.23) (0.70) (-0.12) (0.24)
Alpha -10.9 -4.8 12.2 -2.4 6.3
(-0.42) (-0.25) (0.67) (-0.12) (0.26)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return -27.9 -10.5 9.6 13.2 27.6
(-0.62) (-0.28) (0.26) (0.34) (0.66)
Alpha -28.1 -8.2 10.5 16.3 31.2
(-0.38) (-0.13) (0.17) (0.26) (0.46)
From 2011 to 2017 (after)
Panel A. 1-week
Mean Return 11.9 18.0** 16.2* 18.5* 15.7
(1.30) (2.01) (1.76) (1.90) (1.55)
Alpha 12 18.3** 16.3* 17.9* 14.3
(1.29) (1.98) (1.73) (1.79) (1.38)
Panel B. 4-week
Mean Return 53.1*** 75.3*** 68.9*** 69.6*** 70.8***
(3.21) (4.63) (4.13) (3.89) (3.70)
Alpha 54.0** 76.6*** 69.4*** 69.8*** 68.3**
(2.15) (3.11) (2.72) (2.59) (2.34)
Level Portfolios
Table 13: Performance of level portfolios, over one and four weeks, for three time-periods 
